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a b s t r a c t
In multi-species ﬁsheries managed under ITQs, the existence of joint production may lead to complex
catch-quota balancing issues. Previous modelling and experimental research suggest that, in such
ﬁsheries, some ﬁshers may beneﬁt from the ability to trade packages of ﬁshing quotas, rather than fulﬁl
their quota needs by simultaneously bidding on separate single-species quota markets. This note
presents evidence of naturally occurring package trades in a real ﬁshery. Based on this evidence, we
suggest that further empirical and modelling research is required on the potential and limitations of
package quota trading in mixed ﬁsheries managed with ITQs.
Crown Copyright & 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Individual Transferable Quotas are increasingly being used as a
means to allocate access to wild ﬁsh stocks in commercial ﬁsheries
[1,2]. This includes multi-species ﬁsheries in which some joint
production may occur, leading to complex catch-quota balancing
issues [3–7]. Two articles recently published in this journal [8,9],
based on modelling and experimental research, suggest that, in
such ﬁsheries, some ﬁshers may beneﬁt from the ability to trade
packages of ﬁshing quotas, rather than fulﬁl their quota needs by
simultaneously bidding on separate single species quota markets.
The authors show that such beneﬁts are likely to be higher for
mature market places when the harvesting rights being purchased
present higher degrees of complementarity and when comple-
mentarities vary between market participants. This can be the case
in high synergy environments, when joint catch of multiple
species occurs, or if holding certain packages of quota allows
for signiﬁcant economies of scale – implying that the value of a
package is effectively greater than the sum of its parts when held
in isolation. The presence of non-trivial transaction costs may
similarly increase the value of being able to obtain any quota
required in as few trades as possible.
In this note, we provide empirical evidence that such package
trading of ﬁshing quota may in fact represent a signiﬁcant component
of the day-to-day operation of a ﬁshing quota market, using informa-
tion on the quota market of the Australian Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery
(CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef. The natural occurrence of package
trading in a free market situation serves to validate the suggestions
that such trading behaviour may be beneﬁcial to quota traders under
certain circumstances [8,9]. Based on this evidence, we suggest that
further empirical research be carried out on the potential value of
package quota trading in mixed ﬁsheries with ITQs.
2. Case study
The CRFFF is multi-species in nature. Catch in the ﬁshery is
regulated via the allocation of quota for three groups of species:
coral trout (CT), red throat emperor (RTE), and other species (OS)
[10]. As the name suggests other species incorporates a number of
(approximately 154) reef ﬁsh species, other than coral trout and
red throat emperor, however only a relatively small proportion
of these are actively targeted by the commercial ﬁshery [10]. The
CRFFF is heterogeneous in the spatial distribution of species
exploited, their value, and the scale and setup of the vessels that
target them [11]. The commercial ﬁshery ranges from Cape York
(101410S) at the north of the Great Barrier Reef, to Bundaberg
(241300S) in the south. In general, coral trout and other species
tend to be available throughout this entire range whereas red
throat emperor is more conﬁned to the southern half of the
ﬁshery. While a part of the ﬁshing businesses typically focus on
targeting coral trout in order to supply the higher value live export
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market, they may still incur small amounts of catch of the other
species. In addition, a part of the ﬁshing businesses, usually
operating smaller vessels, will generally land higher proportions
of dead ﬁsh, with a greater proportion of other species. This
heterogeneity results in ﬁshers requiring more than one type of
quota, and in different ﬁshers requiring differing combinations of
quota, to operate in the ﬁshery. Fishers in the CRFFF quota market
thus face a multiple unit heterogeneous goods allocation problem,
as described by Tisdel and Iftekhar [9].
The CRFFF quota management system was introduced on the 1st
of July 2004: shares of total allowable catch limits were allocated to
existing licence owners as individual tradable quotas based mainly
upon their history in the ﬁshery. The quota is completely transfer-
rable meaning that anyone with a quota account is able to buy, sell or
lease quota. Landings cannot be balanced against quota retrospec-
tively so sufﬁcient quota must held in a quota account at the time of
landing. A more comprehensive description of the quota system and
the ﬁshery in general can be found in Thébaud et al. [11]. The
Queensland Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
(QDAFF) keep records of all temporary and permanent quota
transactions that take place in the CRFFF. The information presented
here is based on an anonymised version of the dataset that accounts
for eight years of lease (i.e. temporary) quota trading: from the 1st of
July 2004 up to the end of the 2011–12 ﬁnancial year (30th of June in
Australia). Having now been in operation for eight years this system
arguably represents what may be considered a mature marketplace.
For the purposes of this analysis, trades have been grouped in three
separate quota market categories (coral trout-only, red throat
emperor-only and other species-only trades) and one package quota
trade category, based on the assumption that trades occurring
between the same individuals on the same date could be considered
as package trades.
3. Evidence of package quota trading in the CRFFF
The number of trades and quantity of quota traded each year
are presented in Fig. 1a and b, respectively. Both ﬁgures are broken
down into the categories of quota traded and illustrate that
package trades represent a substantial component of trading
activity in the lease market. The ﬁrst year of quota management
(2004–05) was a period of signiﬁcant adjustment in the ﬁshery,
with relatively low levels of leasing and high levels of permanent
transfers taking place. In particular, the quantity of coral trout
quota leased was exceptionally low, and the proportion of package
trades appeared relatively high. Information on temporary trades
at this time is however not considered particularly representative.
From 2005–06 onwards there has been a gradually increasing
trend in the annual proportion of lease trades based on packages
of quota (Fig. 1c): by 2011–12, temporary package trades
accounted for close to one third (27%) of annual transactions,
having increased from 18% of trades in 2005–06. The proportion of
temporary trades of coral trout-only quota fell substantially over
the same period (from 66% to 38% of the total annual number
temporary trades, Fig. 1c). On the other hand, the proportion of
temporary trades for other species-only quota regularly increased,
up to slightly under that of package quota trades.
Package quota trades appear even more signiﬁcant when
considered in terms of the number of units traded (at present
1 quota unit equates to 1 kg of ﬁsh), accounting for the greatest
number and proportion of total quota units traded in all years,
other than 2008-09 (Fig. 1b and d). On average over the period
considered, units traded in packages represented 46% of the total
number of units traded annually. Coral trout units represented an
average 42% of the number of units traded annually as part of
these package trades.
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Fig. 1. Numbers of temporary trades (left) and quantities of quota traded (right), by trade category (coral trout-only (CT), red throat emperor-only (RTE), other species-only
(OS), and package quota trades); (a and b) as absolute numbers (top); (c and d) as proportions of annual trades and units traded annually (bottom). (a) Numbers of trades, (b)
Quantities of quota traded, (c) Proportion of all trades and (d) Proportion of units traded.
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Inﬂuence of expectations, the potential role of transaction costs
and the perceived risks of not being successful on the quota market
may all serve to explain some of the dynamics observed in these
markets. 2008-09 was a peak year with respect to coral trout landings
[10], which ultimately resulted in increased demand for quota of this
species when compared to previous years. The higher demand for
coral trout quota was unlikely to have been immediately apparent at
the beginning of the year though, when many ﬁshers lease in bundles
of quota based on expectations formed at least in part on the
compositions and levels of catches in previous years (Fig. 2a and b).
Given these circumstances, it is likely that there was a tendency, in the
ﬁrst instance, to not acquire sufﬁcient coral trout quota for the year. As
the season progressed and it became clear that ﬁshers targeting coral
trout would require higher proportions of coral trout quota than
initially expected, this may have resulted in the increase in coral trout-
only quota trades (Figs. 1a, 2a and b) and consequentially a reduction
in the relative quantity of coral trout traded in packages in that year
(Fig. 2c). Subsequent expectations, created by the high coral trout
landings in 2008-09, are believed to have then fuelled the large
increase in the proportion of coral trout traded in packages (as a
proportion of total coral trout traded) in 2008-09, despite coral trout
landings ultimately being lower in this year (Fig. 2c).
Interestingly, package trades are always greatest, in terms of both
number and quantity (Fig. 2a and b), in the ﬁrst trading month of each
season (July) and then generally fall away quickly. Trades of individual
quota types on the other hand typically follow the opposite pattern,
particularly for coral trout, as they are often lowest at the beginning of
the season and progressively build towards a peak nearer the end of
the ﬁshing year. These observations reinforce the belief that ﬁshers
generally acquire the quota they expect they will need via a package
trade at the beginning of the year. As the year progresses and ﬁshers
gain better information on their effective quota needs, they then
undertake additional trades for single types of quota.
Assessing the relative economic importance of the quota trades
considered would require knowledge of quota leasing prices,
which are not readily available for this time period in the ﬁshery.
However, when weighted by the annual average beach prices of
the different species caught, the relative value of the quotas
contained in each trade category becomes apparent (Fig. 2d). In
particular, as live CT is sold at a much higher price than dead red
throat emperor and other species, the catch value associated with
coral trout units traded is high. Over the time period observed,
coral trout units traded in packages represented most of the catch
value of the quota units traded in these packages, and accounted
for 97–99% of the weighted average price. Hence, it appears likely
that most of these trades could be considered as trades focused on
obtaining coral trout, but including the necessary quota for the
associated catch of red throat emperor/other species (as deter-
mined by type of operation, latitude or both).
4. Perspectives
The results obtained by Tisdell and Iftekhar [8,9] indicate that
in the presence of joint production or economies of scale, package
quota trading may offer advantages over simultaneous bidding for
separate quotas across multiple markets. The authors also point to
the fact that different types of bidders may be attracted to either
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Fig. 2. Numbers of trades (a) and quantities of quota traded (b) per month, (c) proportion of traded coral trout quota that was traded as part of a package each year, (d) catch
value (at annual average beach prices) of units traded by category of trade (AU$). (a) Numbers of trades, (b) Quantities of quota traded, (c) Coral trout traded in packages, and
(d) Beach price weighted value of trades.
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one or the other type of trading: operators with high levels of
complementarity in quota types and an ability to trade globally
(across the entire set of markets) may be more inclined to package
trading as this can limit the risks to them of being unsuccessful,
while the opposite may be true of operators trading locally as they
may have greater interest in a particular (single) species. The lease
trading trends observed in the CRFFF ITQ market would appear to
support these conclusions, where package trades have represented
a signiﬁcant and increasing part of the market over the period
considered. In addition to bidder type driving a preference for one
form of trading or another, the inherently unpredictable nature of
exactly what will be caught when ﬁshing is likely to create some
residual demand for single species trading as it allows unantici-
pated differences in ﬁshers catch compositions to be balanced
(as is believed to have been observed with coral trout in 2009–10).
Fishers who own quota mixes that do not align with the typical
composition of their catch are also likely to use single species lease
trading to balance their quota demands.
Interestingly, while Tisdell and Iftekhar discuss the value of
such trading in the context of a formal auctioning system deﬁned
and managed by a regulator, our observations are of trading
patterns which have emerged endogenously from the market
itself. This would lend further ground to the hypothesis that
package trading is seen as a preferable approach to bidding for
quota by a number of operators in the ﬁshery. This may be due to
the reduced transaction costs of undertaking a trade with one as
opposed to many other participants, especially if asymmetrical
transaction costs exist in this market. It may also reﬂect the lower
perceived risks of being unsuccessful at obtaining the required
quota by individual operators in package trades.
Whilst package trading has also been observed in other Australian
ﬁsheries managed under ITQs, and included as a possible approach to
quota trading in a simulation modelling framework [12] there is
limited empirical and modelling research on the actual operation of
multi-species ﬁshing quota markets [1]. The observation of package
trading in the CRFFF lends support to the need for further work in
order to (i) understand the patterns of trading which may evolve in
real ﬁsheries, depending on their technical, economic and biological
characteristics, and (ii) assessing the overall consequences of these
patterns in terms of the efﬁciency of ITQ systems in multi-species
ﬁsheries.
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